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The Interpretation of s. 41 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and the Impact of 
R v A (No 2) ([2002] 1 AC 45) 
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The appellant appealed against his conviction for rape on two grounds. The first ground of appeal 
(to which this case note relates) was that the judge had wrongly excluded evidence of a previous 
consensual sexual encounter between the appellant and the complainant (C). The second ground of 
appeal (which is not considered in this case note) concerned the admissibility of evidence concerning 
two text messages sent by the appellant’s friend (D) to C shortly after the alleged rape. 
C had been drinking in a pub with her friend (M) and a man with whom C had engaged in a brief 
sexual encounter two days earlier. C began texting another man (D) and left to visit D’s flat. On arrival at 
the flat she was taken upstairs to a bathroom where she had consensual sexual intercourse with D. The 
appellant, who was D’s friend, then had sexual intercourse with C in the bathroom, which C maintained 
was against her will. Upon leaving, C telephoned M, who described C as being in a distressed state. M 
asked C if she had been raped to which C replied that she had. M contacted the police who collected C 
from a nearby bus station. The appellant was arrested, along with D and two other men who had been 
present at the flat. No further action was taken against anyone other than the appellant. It was the 
Crown’s case that the appellant had forced C to have sexual intercourse against her will. The appellant 
contended that the intercourse was consensual. 
During a police interview, the appellant said that he had met C on the stairs of D’s flat and they started 
to chat. The appellant also maintained that he had met C on a previous occasion during which consensual 
sexual intercourse had taken place. He stated that during his conversation with C, it became clear that she 
wanted to do the same again so they went upstairs to the bathroom. Consensual sexual intercourse took 
place but this was interrupted when the appellant’s telephone rang. He left the bathroom to take the call, 
but when he returned he found that C had left. C took part in a video identification procedure which 
included the appellant but she could not identify the second person with whom she had sexual inter- 
course as she said that she had not seen him. At trial, the defence were not permitted to question C about 
the alleged previous sexual encounter between the appellant and C, which he had referred to in his 
interview. During cross-examination, the appellant repeated his version of events and maintained that 
the sexual intercourse had been consensual. When asked why he thought C consented, the appellant said 
that they had met previously. C meanwhile maintained that she had never previously met the appellant. 
During her evidence she spoke of having left the pub and made her way to D’s flat after receiving text 
messages from D asking her to go there. When she arrived she was led upstairs to the bathroom where 
consensual sexual intercourse took place with D. Another man was then invited into the bathroom at 
which point D left to take a phone call. C alleged that, when D returned, she was raped by the other man 
in D’s presence and with D’s assistance. 
The defence made two separate and unsuccessful applications to adduce evidence of the previous 
sexual encounter but failed to give formal written notice as required by Criminal Procedure Rules made 
under s. 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. Comments in the appellant’s interview 
referring to the previous sexual encounter were excised from the version of the interview given to the 
jury. Despite the absence of a formal application, it appears that confusion arose from comments made in 
the defence statement which said: ‘The defendant will in due course formally apply under section 41 to 
cross-examine on the defendant’s previous sexual intercourse with the complainant’ (at [18]). Moreover, 
at previous directions hearings, orders had been made for the prosecution to respond to the s. 41 issue. 
The Court of Appeal observed that whilst such directions may have been premature given the absence of 
a formal s. 41 application, they may have led the defence to believe that a formal s. 41 application was 
not required. 
HELD, ALLOWING THE APPEAL, although the absence of a formal s. 41 application amounted 
to a serious failing on the part of the defence, the trial judge had ‘dealt with the applications before him 
on the merits of the oral arguments that were presented before him’ (at [20]). The judge had erred, 
however, by failing to give adequate consideration to the decision in R v A (No.2) ([2002] 1 AC 45). In 
that case the House of Lords held that where the exclusion of evidence under a strict interpretation of s. 
41 endangers the fairness of the proceedings, the court may be required by s. 3 of the Human Rights Act 
1998 to adopt a Convention-friendly interpretation of s. 41 to give effect to the defendant’s fair trial 
rights under Article 6. The judge’s failure to consider the full impact of that decision in the present case 
meant that the relevance of the appellant’s alleged previous consensual sexual encounter with C was not 
properly addressed. 
 
 
Commentary 
The present case demonstrates that difficulties remain with the interpretation of s. 41 of the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. The provision radically departs from its predecessor, s. 2 of the Sexual 
Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, which afforded considerable discretion to judges to determine the 
relevance of sexual history evidence. By stark contrast, s. 41 adopts a ‘pigeonholing’ approach to the 
admissibility of evidence and in doing so predetermines relevance through a closed list of categories or 
‘gateways’ contained in ss 41(3) or (5). In addition to removing judicial discretion by enacting s. 41, 
Parliament evoked further controversy by extending the ‘rape shield’ to include evidence of previous 
sexual behaviour between the complainant and the defendant. In contrast, the 1976 Act had only applied 
to ‘third party’ sexual history evidence, meaning that evidence of previous sexual behaviour occurring 
between the complainant and the defendant could be adduced by the defence without first having to seek 
the permission of the judge. In R v A (No.2) ([2002] 1 AC 45), Lord Steyn expressed his opposition to the 
widening of the ‘rape shield’ in s. 41, which, considered in light of the strict categories approach to 
admitting sexual history evidence, he described as ‘legislative overkill’ (R v A (No.2) at [67]). The 
exclusion of evidence concerning the previous incident in the present case (which contributed to the 
accused’s conviction being quashed) can be attributed to two factors, namely the absence of a formal s. 
41 application and the judge’s failure to adequately assess the impact of R v A (No.2). 
 
The Absence of a Formal s. 41 Application 
Criticism had been aimed at judges under the previous law for failing to ensure that the introduction of 
sexual history evidence followed the correct procedure, which, under s. 2(2) of the 1976 Act, required 
applications to made to the judge in the absence of the jury. Non-compliance with the formal application 
process intensified the distress suffered by complainants who were caught off-guard by evidence that 
had found its way into the courtroom by illegitimate means. Crim PR Part 22 specifies the correct 
procedure for making an application to adduce sexual history evidence under the 1999 Act. Most 
notably, Crim PR Part 22.2 stipulates that s. 41 applications must be made in writing. Part 22.3 provides 
that the application must: 
 
(a) identify the issue to which the defendant says the complainant’s sexual behaviour is relevant; (b) give 
particulars of—(i) any evidence that the defendant wants to introduce, and (ii) any questions that the 
defendant wants to ask; (c) identify the exception to the prohibition in section 41 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999 on which the defendant relies . . .  
 
The circumstances surrounding the previous sexual encounter in the present case could not be fully 
examined because of the absence of a formal s. 41 application which could have provided further detail 
in relation to the factors listed in Crim PR Part 22.3. Moreover, the judge had not fully investigated the 
previous incident during the oral application. This meant that there was insufficient material available to 
determine whether the previous sexual encounter was sufficiently probative. 
 
 
The Judge’s Failure to Adequately Assess the Impact of R v A (No.2) ([2002] 1 AC 45) 
Notwithstanding the absence of a formal s. 41 application which would have enabled a more thorough 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the previous incident, the decision of the judge highlights 
the potential dangers of refusing to depart from a strict interpretation of s. 41. The judge was mindful of 
the dangers of admitting evidence which the defence seek to adduce on the erroneous basis that because a 
complainant has consented in the past she must have consented on the occasion in question. In the 
Canadian case of R v Seaboyer [1991] 2 RCS 577, McLachlin J noted that ‘[t]he fact that a woman has 
had intercourse on other occasions does not in itself increase the logical probability that she consented to 
intercourse with the accused’ (at [604]). Whilst it is difficult to disagree with the judge in the present case 
that past consent is not indicative of present consent, the full impact of the judgment in R v A (No.2) 
appears to have been disregarded in relation to two fundamental points. First, the judge failed to consider 
the important distinction made by their Lordships in R v A (No.2) between evidence of previous sexual 
behaviour occurring between the complainant and the defendant and that involving the complainant and 
third parties. Lord Hutton in R v A (No2) observed that ‘[e]vidence or questions about sexual behaviour 
with third parties is likely to be much harder to justify on grounds of relevancy than evidence about 
sexual behaviour with the defendant’ (R v A (No.2) [2002] 1 AC 45 (at [77]). Lord Steyn also noted that 
‘[a]s a matter of common sense, a prior sexual relationship between the complainant and the accused 
may, depending on the circumstances, be relevant to the issue of consent’ (at [61]). Secondly, it appears 
that the judge did not fully appreciate the impact of s. 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 on that decision 
and its possible application to the present case in relation to the defendant’s Article 6 rights. In R v A 
(No.2) their Lordships were faced with a stark choice: that s. 41 was incompatible with the Convention, 
under s. 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, or that s. 41 could be saved by a Convention-friendly 
interpretation, under s. 3 of the 1998 Act. Section 3 provides that, ‘[s]o far as it is possible to do so, 
primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compa- 
tible with the Convention rights.’ Their Lordships opted for the latter course, with Lord Steyn proposing 
a more nuanced test of relevance to meet the needs of the defendant’s fair trial rights. He observed, 
 
[t]he effect of the decision today is that under section 41(3)(c) of the 1999 Act, construed where necessary by 
applying the interpretative obligation under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and due regard always 
being paid to the importance of seeking to protect the complainant from indignity and from humiliating 
questions, the test of admissibility is whether the evidence (and questioning in relation to it) is nevertheless so 
relevant to the issue of consent that to exclude it would endanger the fairness of the trial under article 6 of the 
Convention. If this test is satisfied the evidence should not be excluded (R v A (No.2) at [69]). 
 
Whilst this test affords some scope to admit evidence that would otherwise have been prohibited 
under a narrow interpretation of s. 41, it is clear that not all previous instances of sexual behaviour 
between the complainant and the defendant will be so relevant as to require s. 41 to be read down in this 
way (e.g. a single historic act of intercourse). Nevertheless, this approach provides a logical basis for 
assessing the probative value of evidence when faced with the prospect of an Article 6 challenge. Lord 
Steyn elaborated further, suggesting that: 
 
it is realistic to proceed on the basis that the legislature would not, if alerted to the problem, have wished to 
deny the right to an accused to put forward a full and complete defence by advancing truly probative material 
(R v A (No.2) at [45]). 
 
Against this backdrop, and as exemplified in the present case, the extent to which the decision in R v A 
(No.2) permits judges to depart from a literal interpretation of s. 41 continues to be a matter of uncer- 
tainty. As a consequence, legislative reform containing clearer guidance on the admissibility of sexual 
history evidence appears to be the only viable option for preserving the rights of both defendants and 
complainants. This should have as its primary objective the replacement of the current ‘pigeonholing’ 
approach, which relies on artificial predetermined categories of relevance, with a new statutory model 
that affords discretion to judges to admit sexual history evidence. It is important to stress, however, that 
such discretion should be coupled with stringent safeguards to prevent abuse; such safeguards were 
lacking under s. 41’s predecessor and this ultimately led to its failure. 
